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Abstract
Modal logic is the foundation for a versatile and well-established class of knowledge representation for-
malisms in artiﬁcial intelligence. Enriching modal logics with non-monotonic reasoning capabilities such
as preferential reasoning as developed by Lehmann and colleagues would therefore constitute a natural
extension of such KR formalisms. Nevertheless, there is at present no generally accepted semantics, with
corresponding syntactic characterization, for preferential consequence in modal logics. In this paper we ﬁll
this gap by providing a natural and intuitive semantics for preferential and rational modal consequence. We
do so by placing a preference order on possible worlds indexed by Kripke models they belong to. We also
prove representation results for both preferential and rational consequence, which paves the way for eﬀective
decision procedures for modal preferential reasoning. We then illustrate applications of our constructions to
modal logics widely used in AI, notably in the contexts of reasoning about actions, knowledge and beliefs.
We argue that our semantics constitutes the foundation on which to explore preferential reasoning in modal
logics in general.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Consider the following scenario depicting a nuclear power station: In a particular
power plant there is an atomic pile and a cooling system, both of which can be either
on or oﬀ. An agent is in charge of detecting hazardous situations and preventing
the plant from malfunctioning (Figure 1).
ON
OFF
DANGER
Fig. 1. The nuclear power station and its controlling agent.
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It is common knowledge that situations in which the pile is on are usually not
hazardous. However, in more speciﬁc contexts, say when the pile is on but the
cooling system is down, one would expect it to be a hazardous situation. One
may then also want to draw conclusions like “if a situation is hazardous, then it
is usually the case that the eﬀect of switching the pile oﬀ brings about a non-
hazardous situation”; or “if the pile is on and the cooling system is oﬀ, then usually
the surveillance agent knows that a malfunction is imminent”; or “situations in
which the pile is on usually ought to be non-hazardous”; or even the more complex
“if the agent believes that there is danger, then usually he must perform the action
of switching the pile oﬀ”.
All of these are examples of defeasible inferences. The ﬁrst two examples are in-
stances of propositional defeasible consequence and are adequately dealt with within
the framework for preferential reasoning developed by Lehmann and colleagues in
the 90’s [16,19]. For the last four examples, however, it is a diﬀerent story: Firstly,
for their speciﬁcation we need a logical language that is richer than the propositional
one: They require, respectively, the ability to express the eﬀects and preconditions
of actions; an agent’s knowledge and beliefs; regulations or obligations; and com-
binations thereof. Well established formalisms for dealing with these notions in
the AI literature are mostly variants of modal logic: The examples above illustrate
applications of dynamic logic [13], epistemic logic [10], and deontic logic [21].
Secondly, it turns out that research on preferential reasoning has really only
reached maturity in a propositional context, whereas many logics of interest, like
the ones mentioned above, have more structure in both syntax and semantics. If
one wants to be able to capture the forms of reasoning exempliﬁed above, then one
has to move beyond propositional preferential consequence.
There has by now been quite a substantial number of attempts to incorporate
defeasible reasoning in logics other than propositional logic. After a ﬁrst tentative
exploration of preferential predicate logics by Lehmann and Magidor [18], some more
recent investigations have attempted to deﬁne notions of defeasibility in deontic log-
ics [22], and of defeasible subsumption for description logics [3,12,5]. Nevertheless,
a generally accepted semantics for preferential reasoning in modal logics, with a
corresponding syntactic characterization, does not yet exist.
In the present paper we aim at ﬁlling this gap by providing a generalization
of classical preferential consequence to an important family of modal logics — we
present the semantic foundation, prove the required representation results, point
out computational consequences and beneﬁts, and suggest applications of modal
preferential reasoning. The good balance between expressivity and computational
properties of modal logics makes them good candidates for the type of extension of
preferential reasoning that we have in mind — with (propositional) modal logic one
can express more than with classical propositional logic without being hampered
by the undecidability of many ﬁrst-order based languages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we brieﬂy re-
cap the seminal work by Lehmann and colleagues on propositional preferential and
rational consequence. We then present an account of modal preferential reasoning
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in Section 3. Importantly, our representation results are with respect to the corre-
sponding propositional properties or rules, and methods employed in a propositional
non-monotonic setting therefore translate seamlessly to a modal context. This in-
cludes reasoning tasks such as computing the preferential or rational closure of a
defeasible knowledge base [19]. Our modal semantics therefore forms the founda-
tion of preferential consequence for a whole class of modal-based formalisms, which
we illustrate with some case studies, namely modal logics of action (Section 4) and
knowledge (Section 5). After discussing some related work (Section 6), we conclude
in Section 7.
2 Propositional Preferential Reasoning
Here we give a brief outline of propositional preferential and rational consequence,
as initially deﬁned by Kraus et al. [16]. A propositional defeasible consequence
relation |∼ is deﬁned as a binary relation on formulas of an underlying (possibly
inﬁnitely generated) propositional logic. |∼ is said to be preferential if it satisﬁes
the following set of properties (below α, β, . . . denote propositional formulas, and |=
and ≡ denote, respectively, propositional entailment and logical equivalence):
(Ref) α |∼ α (And) α |∼ β, α |∼ γ
α |∼ β ∧ γ (Or)
α |∼ γ, β |∼ γ
α ∨ β |∼ γ
(LLE)
α ≡ β, α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ (RW)
α |∼ β, β |= γ
α |∼ γ (CM)
α |∼ β, α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
The semantics of (propositional) preferential consequence relations is in terms
of preferential models; these are partially ordered structures with states labeled
by propositional valuations. We shall make this terminology more precise in the
upcoming section on modal preferential consequence, but it essentially allows for a
partial order on states, with states lower down in the order being more preferred than
those higher up. Given a preferential model P, a pair α |∼ β is in the consequence
relation deﬁned by P if and only if the most preferred α-states are also β-states.
The representation theorem for preferential consequence relations then states:
Theorem 2.1 (Kraus et al. [16]) A defeasible consequence relation is a prefer-
ential consequence relation if and only if it is deﬁned by some preferential model.
If, in addition to the properties of preferential consequence, |∼ also satisﬁes
the following Rational Monotony property, it is said to be a rational consequence
relation:
(RM)
α |∼ β, α |∼ ¬γ
α ∧ γ |∼ β
The semantics of rational consequence relations is in terms of ranked models,
i.e., preferential models in which the preference order is modular :
Deﬁnition 2.2 Given a set S, ≺ ⊆ S × S is modular if and only if ≺ is a partial
order and there is a ranking function rk : S −→ N such that for every s, s′ ∈ S,
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s ≺ s′ if and only if rk(s) < rk(s′).
The representation theorem for rational consequence relations then states:
Theorem 2.3 (Lehmann & Magidor [19]) A defeasible consequence relation is
a rational consequence relation if and only if it is deﬁned by some ranked model.
3 Modal Preferential Consequence
We work in a set of atomic propositions P (together with the distinguished atom ⊥),
using the logical connectives ∧, ¬, and a set of modal operators i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Propositions are denoted by p, q, . . ., and formulas by α, β, . . ., constructed in the
usual way. With L we denote the set of all formulas of the modal language. The
semantics is the standard possible-worlds one:
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Kripke model is a tuple M = 〈W,R,V〉 where W is a set of
possible worlds, R = 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉, where each Ri ⊆ W × W is an accessibility
relation on W, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and V : W −→ 2P is a valuation function.
Satisfaction, validity and (global) entailment are deﬁned in the usual way [2].
In what follows we present the semantic foundation of preferential reasoning for
modal and multi-modal logics. We interpret the defeasible consequence relation |∼
as a relation on formulas of a given underlying modal language.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A defeasible consequence relation |∼ ⊆ L×L is a preferential conse-
quence relation if and only if it satisﬁes the properties (Ref), (LLE), (And), (RW),
(Or), and (CM), with propositional entailment replaced by modal entailment in
the corresponding modal system. |∼ is rational if and only if in addition to being
preferential it also satisﬁes the property (RM).
We propose replacing the propositional valuations in preferential models with
model-world pairs, also sometimes referred to as pointed Kripke models. Given a
particular class (set) of Kripke models M as in Deﬁnition 3.1, let UM denote the
set of all pairs (M , w), where M = 〈W,R,V〉 is a Kripke model in M and w ∈ W.
As alluded to above, our semantics replaces the propositional valuations used in the
preferential models of Lehmann et al. with structures over the set UM. We make
this more precise now. (We shall follow the notation and terminology deﬁned by
Lehmann and colleagues. For more details, the reader is referred to the papers by
Kraus et al. [16] and Lehmann and Magidor [19].)
Let S be a set, the elements of which are called states. Let M be a given class
of Kripke models, and  : S −→ UM be a labeling function mapping every state
to a pair (M , w) where M = 〈W,R,V〉 is a Kripke model such that w ∈ W. Let
≺ ⊆ S× S. Given α ∈ L, we say that s ∈ S satisﬁes α if and only if (s)  α, i.e.,
M , w  α, where (s) = (M , w). We deﬁne α̂ = {s ∈ S | (s)  α}. We say that α̂
is smooth if and only if each s ∈ α̂ is either ≺-minimal in α̂, or there is s′ ∈ α̂
such that s′ ≺ s and s′ is ≺-minimal in α̂. We say that S satisﬁes the smoothness
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condition if and only if for every α ∈ L, α̂ is smooth. We can now deﬁne modal
preferential models:
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let M be a class of Kripke models. A preferential model is a triple
P = 〈S, ,≺〉 where S is a set of states satisfying the smoothness condition,  is a
labeling function mapping states to elements of UM, and ≺ is a strict partial order
on S.
These formal constructions closely resemble those of Kraus et al. [16] and of
Lehmann and Magidor [19], the diﬀerence being that propositional valuations are
replaced with elements of the set UM. In Section 4 we provide an extended example
including an instance of a modal preferential model.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Given α, β ∈ L and a preferential model P = 〈S, ,≺〉, the con-
sequence relation deﬁned by P is denoted |∼P and is deﬁned by: α |∼P β if and
only if every ≺-minimal state s ∈ α̂ is such that s ∈ β̂.
We say that a modal preferential model P satisﬁes the defeasible statement
α |∼ β if and only if α |∼P β holds.
We are now in a position to state one of our central results:
Theorem 3.5 A modal defeasible consequence relation is a preferential consequence
relation if and only if it is deﬁned by some preferential model.
Proof. The proof is outlined in Appendix A. 
The signiﬁcance of this is that the representation result is proved with respect
to the same set of properties used to characterize propositional preferential conse-
quence. We therefore argue that our deﬁnition of preferential models provide the
foundation for a semantics for preferential (and rational) consequence for a whole
class of multi-modal logics. We do not claim that this is the appropriate notion of
preferential consequence for all modal logics, but rather that it describes the basic
framework within which to investigate such notions.
In order to obtain a similar result for rational consequence, we restrict ourselves
to those preferential models in which ≺ is a modular order on states (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 2.2):
Deﬁnition 3.6 A ranked model Pr is a preferential model 〈S, ,≺〉 in which the
strict partial order ≺ on S is modular.
Since ranked models are preferential models, the notion of rational consequence
is as in Deﬁnition 3.4. We can then state the following result:
Theorem 3.7 A defeasible consequence relation is a rational consequence relation
if and only if it is deﬁned by some ranked model.
Proof. The proof is outlined in Appendix B. 
One of the primary reasons for deﬁning non-monotonic consequence relations of
the kind we have presented above is to obtain a semantic notion, with corresponding
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proof-theoretic decision procedure, of defeasible entailment [19]: Given a set of
defeasible statements of the form α |∼ β, where |∼ is now viewed as a connective in
an enriched modal language, which other defeasible statements should one be able
to derive from this?
Deﬁnition 3.8 A modal defeasible knowledge base K|∼ is a ﬁnite set of statements
α |∼ β, where α, β ∈ L.
A preferential model P satisﬁes a defeasible knowledge base K|∼ if and only
if P satisﬁes every statement in K|∼, i.e., for every α |∼ β ∈ K|∼, α |∼P β.
We deﬁne modal preferential entailment in the obvious way:
Deﬁnition 3.9 α |∼ β is preferentially entailed by K|∼ if and only if α |∼P β
for every preferential model P satisfying K|∼. The set of defeasible statements
preferentially entailed by K|∼ is called the modal preferential closure of K|∼.
The modal preferential closure of K|∼ coincides with the intersection of all pref-
erential consequence relations containing K|∼, and is a preferential consequence
relation. Modal rational entailment can be deﬁned in a similar way:
Deﬁnition 3.10 α |∼ β is rationally entailed by K|∼ if and only if α |∼Pr β for
every ranked model Pr satisfying K|∼.
However, as in the propositional case [19], the obvious deﬁnition of modal rational
closure based on modal rational entailment does not produce an appropriate result.
Theorem 3.11 Given a defeasible knowledge base K|∼, the set of defeasible state-
ments rationally entailed by K|∼ is exactly the preferential closure of K|∼.
Proof. The proof is similar to the propositional case [19, Theorem 4.2]. 
The main consequence of this result is that modal rational entailment does not,
in general, produce a consequence relation which is rational.
The argument to deﬁne and construct a viable notion of rational closure is analo-
gous to that given by Lehmann and Magidor [19] in the propositional case. First, we
deﬁne a preference ordering on consequence relations, with relations further down
in the ordering interpreted as more preferred.
Deﬁnition 3.12 Let K|∼ be a defeasible knowledge base. The preference order 
generated by K|∼ is a binary relation on the set of rational consequence relations
containing K|∼, deﬁned as follows: |∼0 is preferable to |∼1 (written |∼0  |∼1) if and
only if
• there is (α, β) ∈ |∼1 \ |∼0 such that for all γ such that γ ∨ α |∼0 ¬α and for all δ
such that γ |∼0 δ, we also have γ |∼1 δ; and
• for every γ, δ ∈ L, if γ |∼ δ is in |∼0 \ |∼1, then there is an assertion ρ |∼ ν in
|∼1 \ |∼0 such that ρ ∨ γ |∼1 ¬γ.
Given a defeasible knowledge base K|∼, the idea is to deﬁne modal rational
closure as the most preferred (with respect to ) of all the rational consequence
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relations containing K|∼. This leads to the following important deﬁnition of modal
rational closure for defeasible knowledge bases:
Deﬁnition 3.13 Let K|∼ be a defeasible knowledge base, let KR be the class of
rational consequence relations containing K|∼, and let  be the preference ordering
on KR generated by K|∼. If  has a (unique) minimum element |∼, then the modal
rational closure of K|∼ is deﬁned as |∼.
Clearly then, if the modal rational closure exists, it is a rational consequence
relation. In order to provide the conditions for the existence of modal rational
closure, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne a ranking of formulas with respect to K|∼ which, in
turn, is based on a notion of exceptionality. The ranking of formulas can also be
used to deﬁne an algorithm for computing the modal rational closure, when it exists
(see below and the discussion in Section 6).
A formula α is said to be exceptional for a defeasible knowledge base K|∼ if
and only if K|∼ preferentially entails  |∼ ¬α. A defeasible statement α |∼ β is
exceptional for K|∼ if and only if its antecedent α is exceptional for K|∼.
It turns out that checking for exceptionality can be reduced to classical modal
entailment checking.
Lemma 3.14 Given a defeasible knowledge base K|∼, let K→ be its classical coun-
terpart in which every defeasible statement of the form γ |∼ δ in K|∼ is replaced by
γ → δ. The formula α is exceptional for K|∼ if and only if ¬α is globally entailed
by K→: i.e., if and only if K→ |= ¬α.
Proof. The proof is similar to the propositional case [19, Corollary 5.22]. 
Let E(K|∼) denote the subset of K|∼ containing statements that are exceptional
for K|∼. We deﬁne a non-increasing sequence of subsets of K|∼ as follows: E0 = K|∼,
and for i > 0, Ei = E(Ei−1). Clearly there is a smallest integer k such that for
all j ≥ k, Ej = Ej+1. From this we deﬁne the rank of a formula with respect
to K|∼ as follows: rK|∼(α) = k− i, where i is the smallest integer such that α is not
exceptional for Ei. If α is exceptional for Ek (and therefore exceptional for all Es),
then rK|∼(α) = 0. Intuitively, the lower the rank of a formula, the more exceptional
it is with respect to the defeasible knowledge base K|∼.
Theorem 3.15 Let K|∼ be a ﬁnite defeasible knowledge base. The rational closure
of K|∼ exists and is the set R|∼ of defeasible statements α |∼ β such that either
rK|∼(α) > rK|∼(α ∧ ¬β), or rK|∼(α) = 0 (in which case rK|∼(α ∧ ¬β) = 0).
Proof. The proof is outlined in Appendix C. 
Observe from Lemma 3.14 that the determination of the rank of a formula can be
reduced to classical (global) entailment checking for the modal logic under consid-
eration. It is therefore easy to construct a (na¨ıve) decidable algorithm to determine
whether a given defeasible statement is in the modal rational closure of a ﬁnite
defeasible knowledge base K|∼.
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Recent work by Casini and Straccia [5] in the context of description logics makes
it possible to improve on this algorithm, from an implementation point of view.
Casini and Straccia proposed a syntactic operational characterization of rational
closure for the description logic ALC, but without providing a semantic counter-
part. The algorithm draws on work by Lehmann and Magidor [19], Freund [11] and
Poole [23], is based on performing a number of classical entailment checks (for ALC),
and is easily amenable to implementation. From their description it is clear that
the number of classical entailment checks needed is quadratic in the size of the
knowledge base under consideration.
The signiﬁcance of their work for us is that their algorithm can readily be ad-
justed to determine the modal rational closure of a defeasible knowledge base K|∼,
with rational closure membership checking being reduced to a number of modal
global entailment checks that is quadratic in the size of K|∼. For the modal logics
we consider here, determining membership of the modal rational closure is therefore
no harder than global entailment checking.
In what follows we analyze applications of our constructions to some classes of
modal logics commonly used in AI. A further application area, in the context of the
description logic ALC, was recently explored by the present authors [4].
4 Preferential Reasoning about Actions
There is in the AI literature a fair number of modal-based formalisms for reasoning
about actions and change [8,7,26,9]. These are essentially variants of the multi-
modal logic K, in which the modal operators are determined by a (ﬁnite) set of
actions A = {a1, . . . , an}: For each a ∈ A, there is associated a modal operator
[a]. Formulas of the form [a]α are used to specify the eﬀects of actions and they
read as “after every execution of action a, the formula α holds”. The operator 〈a〉 is
mostly used to specify the executability of actions: 〈a〉 reads as “there is a possible
execution of action a”.
In our nuclear power plant example, P = {p, c, h}, where p stands for “the
atomic pile is on”, c for “the cooling system is on”, and h for “hazardous situation”.
As for the actions, we have A = {f,m}, where f stands for “ﬂipping the pile switch”,
and m for “malfunction”. One possible speciﬁcation of such a scenario is given by
the following knowledge base:
K = {(p ∧ ¬c) ↔ h, h → 〈m〉, p → [f]¬p, 〈f〉}
(We note that specifying a solution to the frame problem is beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead, we refer the reader to the solutions provided by the above-mentioned
frameworks which can, in principle, be integrated into the present formalism in a
straightforward way.) K basically says that “a hazardous situation is one in which
the pile is on and the cooler oﬀ”, “a hazardous situation may lead to a malfunction”,
“if the pile is on, then ﬂipping switches it oﬀ”, and “one can always ﬂip the pile
switch”. We can then conclude K |= p → [f]¬h, K |= [m]⊥ → (¬p ∨ c), and
K |= [m]〈f〉¬p ∨ [f]h.
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Recalling our discussion in the Introduction, with such a speciﬁcation one cannot
reason with exceptionalities given by statements of the form “a situation in which
the pile is on is usually not hazardous” and “a situation in which the pile is on and
the cooling system is oﬀ is usually hazardous”. Thanks to our constructions from
the previous section, we can move to a defeasible version of a modal logic of actions
in which one can capture defeasible consequences.
As an example, assume we are given M = {M1,M2}, where M1 and M2 are as
depicted in Figure 2.
M1 :
cw2 w3
p, cw1 p, h w4
mf f
f
f
M2 :
cw2 w3
p, cw1 p, h w4
mf
f
m
f f
Fig. 2. Models depicting the behavior of actions in our nuclear power station scenario.
Hence UM = {(Mi, wj) | i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}}. Assume S = {si | 1 ≤ i ≤ 8},
and let a labeling function  be such that (s1) = (M1, w1), (s2) = (M2, w1),
(s3) = (M1, w2), (s4) = (M1, w3), (s5) = (M2, w3), (s6) = (M2, w2), (s7) =
(M1, w4), and (s8) = (M2, w4). The order ≺ is given by: s1 ≺ s3, s2 ≺ s3, s3 ≺ s4,
s3 ≺ s5, s4 ≺ s6, s5 ≺ s6, s6 ≺ s7, and s6 ≺ s8. Figure 3 below depicts the
preferential model P = 〈S, ,≺〉.
P :
s7 : (M1, w4), s8 : (M2, w4)
s6 : (M2, w2)
s4 : (M1, w3), s5 : (M2, w3)
s3 : (M1, w2)
s1 : (M1, w1), s2 : (M2, w1) m
o
st
p
re
fe
rr
ed
←−
−−
−−
−−
−−
−
Fig. 3. Preferential model for the nuclear power plant scenario.
The rationale of this partial order is as follows: The utility company selling the
electricity generated by the power plant tries as far as possible to keep both the pile
and the cooling system on, ensuring that the pile can be easily switched oﬀ (states s1
and s2); sometimes the company has to switch the pile oﬀ for maintenance but then
tries to keep the cooler running, preferably if turning the pile on again does not cause
a fault in the cooling system (state s3); more rarely the company needs to switch
oﬀ both the pile and the cooler, e.g. when the latter needs maintenance (states s4
and s5); in an exceptional situation, turning the pile on may interfere with the cooler
switching it oﬀ (state s6); and, ﬁnally, only in very exceptional situations would the
pile be on while the cooler is oﬀ, e.g. during a serious malfunction (states s7 and s8).
Let |∼P be the defeasible consequence relation deﬁned by the model P above
(cf. Deﬁnition 3.4). Then we can check that c ∧ 〈f〉 |∼P [f]c (usually, ﬂipping
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the switch does not shut down the cooler); ¬p ∧ c |∼P [f]¬h (turning the pile on,
when the cooler is on, usually does not lead to a hazardous situation);  |∼P [m]⊥
(meltdowns are unlikely); p∧¬c |∼P [m]¬h (it is not the case that once a malfunction
has taken place in a hazardous situation, one is usually in a safe situation); and
¬p ∧ c |∼P 〈f〉〈m〉 (it is not usually the case that turning the pile on may lead to
a situation in which a malfunction is possible).
Moreover, thanks to our representation result (Theorem 3.5), we know that |∼P
is a preferential consequence relation (actually it turns out to be a rational conse-
quence relation, since ≺ here is a modular partial order).
We started our example with a classical knowledge base, and then constructed a
semantic rational consequence relation. This illustrated the semantics well, but in
practice we may rather start with a defeasible knowledge base K|∼, from which we
may draw defeasible conclusions. The semantics is then hidden from the user, as it
forms part of the internal working of the reasoner. In the next section we analyze
an example of reasoning with a defeasible knowledge base.
5 Epistemic Preferential Reasoning
Another family of modal logics that is of great interest from the standpoint of AI
is that of epistemic logics, which allow for reasoning about knowledge [10].
The language of basic epistemic logic contains a (ﬁnite) set of agents A =
{A1, . . . , An}. For each agent A ∈ A there is a knowledge operator KA. Formulas
are recursively deﬁned in the usual way with {KA1 , . . . ,KAn} as modal operators.
A formula of the form KAα is used to specify agent A’s knowledge about the world
and it is read as “agent A knows that α is the case”. For instance, KA1(α ∧KA2α)
formalizes the fact that “agent A1 knows both α and that agent A2 also knows α”.
The core of epistemic logic is the normal multi-modal logic Km. Hence, the
following version of axiom schema K is valid: KAα ∧ KA(α → β) → KAβ, i.e., “if
A knows both α and α → β, then she also knows β”. Stronger epistemic logics are
obtained by adding additional schemata, expressing speciﬁc desired properties of
knowledge, to the basic system K. Since K is at the heart of these logics, we shall
suﬃce with it in our exposition below.
In our example, let us assume that we have two agents, say A and B. The set P
is as in the previous section, with the propositions p, c and h keeping their previous
intuition. We have the following defeasible knowledge base K|∼:
⎧⎨
⎩
h |∼ p ∧ ¬c, p ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬h |∼ ⊥, h |∼ KA(p ∧ ¬c), h ∧ p ∧ ¬c |∼ KBKA¬c,
KBp |∼ p ∧ c, KBp ∧KA¬p |∼ ¬p, KBp ∧KB¬c |∼ p ∧ ¬c
⎫⎬
⎭
The intuition conveyed by K|∼ is as follows: Hazardous situations are usually
ones in which the pile is on and the cooler is oﬀ. The statement p ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬h |∼ ⊥
encodes the ‘hard’ constraint p∧¬c → h [19, p. 6]. Then we have that in hazardous
situations our agent A usually believes the pile is indeed on and the cooler is oﬀ. In
hazardous situations where the pile is on and the cooler is oﬀ, agent B knows that
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agent A knows that the cooler is down. Then B is usually right about his belief that
the pile is on (unless A believes the opposite, in which case it is oﬀ); moreover the
cooler is also on (unless he knows otherwise, in which case it is oﬀ).
From the defeasible knowledge base K|∼ we can preferentially derive the defeasi-
ble statement h∧p∧¬c |∼ KA¬c∧KBKA¬c: in hazardous situations due to the pile
being on while the cooler is oﬀ, usually agent A knows that the cooling is down and
B knows that A knows this is the case. Since we know that the preferential closure
is a preferential consequence relation (cf. comment after Deﬁnition 3.9), this can be
derived by applying properties (RW), (CM) and (And) to the defeasible statements
in K|∼.
K|∼ does not entail KBp∧KB¬c∧¬KAh |∼ h preferentially: situations in which B
knows both that the pile is on and the cooler is oﬀ, and in which A does not know
there is a hazard, are not usually hazardous. We (i.e., the underlying reasoner) can
easily construct a modal preferential model satisfying K|∼ that does not satisfy the
statement above. Let M be the Kripke model in Figure 4.
cw2 w3
p, cw1 p, h w4
B
A
A B
A
A
B
A
Fig. 4. A Kripke model depicting knowledge of two agents in our nuclear power station scenario.
From M we construct a modal preferential model P = 〈S, ,≺〉, where S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4}, (si) = (M , wi), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, and s1 ≺ s2, s2 ≺ s3, and s3 ≺ s4. It can
be checked that P satisﬁes K|∼. However, KBp ∧KB¬c ∧ ¬KAh |∼P h.
It can be checked that KBp∧KB¬c∧¬KAh |∼ h is in the modal rational closure
of the defeasible knowledge base K|∼.
6 Related Work
This paper builds on current work on ALC [4], in which rational closure for ALC is
studied in more detail.
Also in a DL setting, Britz et al. [3] and Giordano et al. [12] use typicality
orderings on objects in ﬁrst-order domains to deﬁne defeasible subsumption in ALC.
Both approaches deﬁne rational consequence relations, but without representation
results. In contrast, we provide a general semantic framework which, unlike these
proposals, is relevant to all logics with a possible worlds semantics. This is because
our semantics for defeasible consequence yields a single order on relational structures
at the meta level, rather than ad hoc relativized orders at the object level.
The notion of defeasibility in action theories has been dealt with in non-modal
frameworks for reasoning about actions [1,27]. Contrary to ours, their work is not
concerned with extending preferential reasoning to more expressive logics. However,
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defeasible statements of the kind we studied here can be used in reasoning about
the qualiﬁcations of actions: In situations where α holds, the action a is usually
executable; but in the more speciﬁc context α′, a’s execution fails. In that sense,
our framework also stands as an approach to the qualiﬁcation problem [20] and to
the more general problem of revising action domain descriptions [24,25].
As mentioned in Section 3, Casini and Straccia [5] recently proposed an algo-
rithm for determining rational closure in the context of description logics. Their
algorithm can be adjusted to determine the modal rational closure as deﬁned in Def-
inition 3.13. From the description of this algorithm it follows that, for the modal
logics under consideration here, determining membership of the modal rational clo-
sure is no harder than global entailment checking. Furthermore, the algorithm
can readily be extended to implement reﬁnements presented by presumptive rea-
soning [17], and inheritance networks [6]. We are currently investigating further
optimizations of the algorithm via suitable deﬁnitions of modularity for defeasible
knowledge bases [14,15].
7 Concluding Remarks
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) we ﬁlled an important gap in
the non-monotonic reasoning community by providing a natural and intuitive se-
mantics for preferential reasoning in modal logics; (ii) we gave to our semantics
a corresponding syntactic characterization via our representation results; (iii) we
established the basis with which to ‘lift’ the propositional notions of defeasible con-
sequence and closure to modal logics in general, and (iv) we illustrated how our
constructions can be applied in two important families of modal logic.
The simple modal logics that we have assessed here are the backbone of well es-
tablished formalisms for reasoning about actions, knowledge, obligations, and com-
binations thereof. A proper understanding of preferential reasoning for basic modal
logic is therefore important for ﬁnding speciﬁc deﬁnitions of defeasible reasoning in
these logics. In that sense, we believe that the results we develop here pave the way
for extending preferential and rational consequence, and hence also rational closure,
to a whole class of logics for knowledge representation and reasoning.
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A Proof Sketch for Theorem 3.5
Lemma A.1 (Soundness) For any preferential model P, the consequence rela-
tion it deﬁnes is a preferential relation.
Let |∼ denote a preferential relation, i.e., |∼ satisﬁes the properties for preferen-
tial reasoning from Section 2.
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Deﬁnition A.2 A pair (M , w) ∈ U is normal for α ∈ L iﬀ for every β ∈ L s.t.
α |∼ β, M , w  β.
Lemma A.3 Let |∼ satisfy (Ref), (RW), and (And), and let α, β ∈ L. All normal
(M , w) for α satisfy β iﬀ α |∼ β.
Deﬁnition A.4 Let α, β ∈ L. α  β iﬀ α ∨ β |∼ α.
We construct a preferential model as in Deﬁnition 3.3. Let P = 〈S, ,≺〉, where:
• S = {〈M , w, α〉 | (M , w) ∈ U is normal for α ∈ L};
• (〈M , w, α〉) = (M , w);
• 〈M , w, α〉 ≺ 〈M ′, w′, β〉 iﬀ α  β and M , w  β.
Lemma A.5 ≺ is a strict partial order on S.
Lemma A.6 For any α ∈ L, α̂ ⊆ S is smooth.
Lemma A.7 α |∼ β iﬀ α |∼P β.
Proof Sketch for Theorem 3.5. Soundness is given by Lemma A.1. For the
only if part, let |∼ be a preferential consequence relation, and let P be deﬁned as
above. We showed in Lemmas A.5 and A.6 that P is indeed a preferential model.
Lemma A.7 shows that P deﬁnes a consequence relation that is exactly |∼. 
B Proof Sketch for Theorem 3.7
Lemma B.1 (Soundness) If Pr is a ranked model, then the consequence relation
|∼Pr it deﬁnes is rational.
Let |∼ denote a rational relation, i.e., |∼ satisﬁes the properties for preferential
reasoning from Section 2 plus (RM).
Deﬁnition B.2 α ∈ L is consistent w.r.t. |∼ iﬀ α |∼ ⊥. Given Pr = 〈S, ,≺〉, α is
consistent w.r.t. |∼Pr iﬀ α |∼Pr⊥, i.e., iﬀ there is s ∈ S s.t. s ∈ α̂.
Let C = {α ∈ L | α is consistent w.r.t. |∼}.
Deﬁnition B.3 Given α, β ∈ C , α is not more exceptional than β, written αRβ,
iﬀ α ∨ β |∼ ¬α. α is as exceptional as β, written α ∼ β, iﬀ αRβ and βRα.
That ∼ is an equivalence relation follows from the fact that R is reﬂexive and
transitive. With α we denote the equivalence class of α. The set of equivalence
classes of elements of C under ∼ is denoted by C . We write α ≤ β iﬀ αRβ, and
α < β iﬀ α ≤ β and α ∼ β.
We construct a ranked model as in Deﬁnition 3.6. Let Pr = 〈S, ,≺〉, where:
• S = {〈M , w, α〉 | (M , w) is normal for α ∈ L};
• (〈M , w, α〉) = (M , w);
• 〈M , w, α〉 ≺ 〈M ′, w′, β〉 iﬀ α < β.
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Lemma B.4 ≺ is a modular partial order.
Lemma B.5 Let α ∈ L be consistent. α̂ ⊆ S is smooth.
Lemma B.6 α |∼ β iﬀ α |∼Pr β.
Proof Sketch for Theorem 3.7. Soundness is given by Lemma B.1. For the only
if part, let |∼ be a rational consequence relation, and Pr be as deﬁned above. By
Lemmas B.4 and B.5, Pr is a ranked model. Lemma B.6 shows that Pr deﬁnes a
consequence relation that is exactly |∼. 
C Proof Sketch for Theorem 3.15
We ﬁrst show that R|∼ contains K|∼ and then that R|∼ is a rational consequence
relation. The remainder of the proof is concerned with showing that if R|∼1 is a
diﬀerent rational consequence relation containing K|∼ , then R|∼  R|∼1 , which
proves that R|∼ is the modal rational closure of K|∼. This part of the proof makes
use of the ranks of formulas, but the crucial aspect is the use of three ranked models
Pr, P ′r, andP ′′r . Pr is a ranked model characterizingR|∼1 , whileP ′′r is constructed
from Pr, and P ′r is constructed from P ′′r . The models P ′′r and P ′r are used to
show that R|∼  R|∼1 . 
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